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Enhanced Protections For Geographical
Indications Under TRIPs:
Potential Conflicts Under the U.S.
Constitutional and Statutory Regimes 
David Snyder* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the controversy over intellectual property protections for 
geographical indications, a rose by any other name would not 
smell as sweet.  The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”) defines geographical 
indications as “indications which identify a good as originating in 
the territory of a [signatory nation], or a region or locality in that 
territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic 
of the good is essentially attributable to its geographic origin.”1  
Although TRIPs provides protections for geographical indications, 
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2821.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
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my family for everything, and the staff of the Journal for their support.  All mistakes are
my own.
 1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE 
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 321 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPs].
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such as “ROQUEFORT” or “COGNAC,” the recent push for 
enhanced protections, spearheaded by the European Union, is 
strongly opposed by the “New World.”2  Opponents are concerned 
that the European Union’s proposal to re-appropriate terms such as 
“Feta,” “Parmesan,” “Mozzarella,” and “Champagne,” which have 
arguably become generic in the U.S., will adversely affect business 
and trade.3  However, in addition to these pragmatic concerns, 
effective implementation of the European proposal in the U.S. may 
be undermined by constitutional and statutory restrictions.4 
This Note discusses the potential impediments to the 
implementation of an enhanced TRIPs Agreement, and discusses 
one possible compromise solution.  Part I of this Note provides a 
background discussion on geographical indications, the TRIPs 
Agreement, and opposition surrounding the European Union’s 
proposal.  Part II analyzes U.S. domestic trademark law under the 
Lanham Act and judicial precedent, and discusses the ways in 
which geographical indications have been protected therein.  Part 
III notes the main sources of conflict against which an enhanced 
TRIPs Agreement may founder: the First Amendment, and the 
statutory scheme under the Lanham Act.  Finally, Part IV 
discusses, first, one possible compromise, in which the Europeans 
relinquish their designs to “propertize” generic terms in favor of a 
regulatory scheme, and second, the practical and political 
impediments that would remain in either scenario. 
 
 2 2 THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
14:19 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing legislative changes which will prohibit new uses of 
semi-generic names on non-European wines) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS]. 
 3 United States Department of Agriculture, WTO: Beyond the Agreement on 
Agriculture (Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/WTO/geoindications.htm 
[hereinafter WTO Agriculture]; see also Albrecht Conrad, The Protection of 
Geographical Indications in the TRIPS Agreement, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 11, 18–19 
(1996). 
 4 See Conrad, supra note 3, at 20–21. 
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I. GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS & THE  
INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE 
A. The TRIPs Framework 
Prior to TRIPs, various multilateral agreements provided 
differing guidelines for intellectual property protections.5  The 
1994 conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade saw the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement, 
which aimed to harmonize then-existing intellectual property 
systems.6  Non-discrimination served as the first policy basis of 
TRIPs; nations agreed to treat foreigners and nationals equally, and 
pledged to offer equal treatment for nationals of all WTO trading 
partners.7  TRIPs’ second policy undercurrent was the belief that 
greater intellectual property protections would allow for increased 
technological innovation, resulting in economic and social benefits 
to producers and consumers alike.8  In furtherance of this policy, 
TRIPs mandated that its signatories amend their domestic legal 
regimes in order to provide certain minimum levels of intellectual 
property protections.9  These protections covered copyrights, 
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, 
layout designs of integrated circuits and trade secrets.10  TRIPs 
also required its signatories to ensure the availability of 
enforcement procedures “so as to permit effective action against 
any act of infringement of intellectual property rights . . . including 
expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which 
 
 5 A lengthy discussion of these agreements is out of the scope of this Note.  However, 
these agreements include the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 
Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583; the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations 
of Origin and their International Registration, Oct. 31, 1958, 923 U.N.T.S. 205; and the 
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, 
828 U.N.T.S. 389. 
 6 DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL 
BUSINESS PROBLEMS 383 (3d ed. 2003). 
 7 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Agreements—Intellectual 
Property: Protection and Enforcement, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 
tif_e/agrm7_e.htm. 
 8 Id. 
 9 VAGTS ET AL., supra note 6, at 383. 
 10 See TRIPs, supra note 1. 
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constitute a deterrent to further infringements.”11  Trade-related 
disagreements between TRIPs signatory nations would be resolved 
under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, a legal text that 
outlines WTO settlement dispute procedures.12 
B. Geographical Indications Under TRIPs 
Articles 22, 23 and 24 of the TRIPs Agreement endeavor to 
protect geographical indications from (1) the use of false or 
misleading indications; (2) the registration of geographical 
indications as trademarks; and (3) “genericide,” or the dilution of 
geographical indications into generic terms.13  Under Article 22, 
signatories must provide the legal means to protect consumers 
from the misleading use of geographical indications.14  Moreover, 
signatories are obligated to “refuse or invalidate the registration of 
a trademark which contains or consists of a geographical indication 
with respect to goods not originating in the territory indicated, if 
use of the indication . . . is of such a nature as to mislead the public 
as to the true place of origin.”15  Although Article 22 grants 
signatories discretion to implement methods of enforcement for 
geographical indication protections, TRIPs mandates that, at 
minimum, enforcement procedures be “available” in each 
signatory nation so as to permit effective action against any act of 
infringement.16 
Article 23 of TRIPs imposes heightened levels of protection for 
geographical indications for wines and spirits.17  Under this 
Article, member nations must “provide the legal means” for parties 
to prevent the use of inexact or misidentified geographical 
 
 11 Id. art. 41. 
 12 See World Trade Organization, Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/about_e/19dis_e.htm. 
 13 See Conrad, supra note 3, at 45. 
 14 TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 22(1). 
 15 Id. art. 22(3). 
 16 Id. art. 41(1). 
 17 See id. art. 23(1) (“Each member shall provide the legal means for interested parties 
to prevent use of a geographical indication identifying wines for wines not originating in 
the place indicated by the geographical indication in question or identifying spirits for 
spirits not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication in question.”). 
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indications for wines and spirits.18  This regulation applies even 
where the true origin of the goods is indicated, or the geographical 
indication is used in translation, or accompanied by expressions 
such as “kind,” “type,” “style,” or “imitation.”19  Thus, unlike 
Article 22, Article 23 protects geographical indications for wines 
and spirits regardless of whether their proffered use would actually 
result in consumer confusion.  In order to facilitate the continued 
protection of geographical indications for wines and spirits, Article 
23 calls for future negotiations and the establishment of a 
multilateral system of notification and registration.20 
Article 24 establishes significant limitations and exceptions to 
the protections codified in Articles 22 and 23.  For example, 
Article 24 grandfathers in certain preexisting usages of 
geographical indications that would otherwise violate the TRIPs 
Agreement.21  Signatories are not required to prevent the use of 
another member’s geographical indication, where the usage at 
issue has been in a continuous manner for like products, or in good 
faith, for at least ten years prior to the signing of TRIPs.22 
Moreover, Article 24 emphasizes that signatories need not protect 
geographical indications with respect to products for which the 
indication is “identical with the term customary in common 
language as the common name for such goods or services in the 
territory of that Member.”23  Thus, U.S. producers could use a 
geographical indication that is protected in France, so long as that 
indication is generic in the U.S.24 Specific examples include 
SWISS and CHEDDAR cheeses, SWEDISH meatballs, PEKING 
duck, and HAMBURGER meat patties.25  Finally, Article 24 notes 
that members are not required to protect geographical indications 
that have ceased to be protected in the country of origin, or which 
have fallen into disuse there.26 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. art. 23(4). 
 21 Id. art. 24(4). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. art. 24(6). 
 24 Conrad, supra note 3, at 40. 
 25 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 14:19. 
 26 TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 24(9). 
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C. The Road Ahead 
On first glance, the geographical indication provisions of the 
TRIPs Agreement appear to signify landmark international accord 
on the issue of protection of geographical locations.  However, 
many TRIPs signatories remained dissatisfied with current 
protections, and argued for both the creation of a multilateral 
register for wines and spirits, as well as extending the higher level 
of protections associated with wines and spirits to all products.27  
The latter proposal is the focus of the following discussion. 
TRIPs members in favor of extending protections, and those 
opposed to them, fell roughly into an Old World-New World 
divide.28  By 2003, the European Union and others29 called for 
terminating the use of certain generic names for food, wine and 
spirits unless the products at issue actually came from the regions 
identified.30  The European Union and its allies view enhanced 
geographical indication protection as a means to prevent other 
countries from “usurping” their appellations of origin, as well as a 
path to improved product marketing.31  During the 2003 WTO 
meeting in Cancun, Mexico, the European Union requested that 
over forty product terms containing ostensibly generic 
geographical indications be protected.32  Products affected by this 
“claw back” proposal would not be saleable, even if such products 
did not actually mislead consumers as to product origin.33 
 
 27 World Trade Organization, TRIPS: Geographical Indications—Background and the 
Current Situation (Nov. 21, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_ 
background_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Background]. 
 28 Id. 
 29 These countries include Bulgaria, Guinea, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia and 
Turkey. See WTO Agriculture, supra note 3. 
 30 Id. 
 31 WTO Background, supra note 27. 
 32 See WTO Agriculture, supra note 3. Product terms, which contain ostensibly generic 
geographical indications, include Beaujolais, Bordeaux, Chablis, Champagne, Chianti, 
Asiago, Feta, Fontina, Mozzarella di Bufala Campagna, Prosciutto di Parma, and 
Roquefort. Id. 
 33 Id. 
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Although the Cancun negotiations collapsed,34 the European 
Union renewed its efforts to achieve heightened protections in its 
2005 Proposal.35  This Proposal remains consistent with the 2003 
plan; it seeks to extend the regime of protection currently available 
for wines and spirits to geographical indications on all products.36  
However, the 2005 Proposal also contains a “grandfather” 
provision that would exempt from the “claw back”37 those 
producers who have used a geographical indication in a continuous 
manner with regard to the same or related goods either for at least 
ten years preceding the date of the amendment, or in good faith 
preceding that date.38 
Those who oppose the 2005 Proposal are led by the United 
States,39 and contend that the existing level of protection for 
geographical indications in Article 22 remains adequate.40  These 
opponents are concerned that any enhanced protection would 
burden and disrupt legitimate business practices.41  As the then-
Deputy Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office noted, 
the European Union 
 
 34 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Statement of 14 September 2003, 
WT/MIN(03)/20 (2003) (stating that although considerable progress has been made at the 
Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, “more work needs to be done in some key areas 
to enable us to proceed towards the conclusion of the negotiations in fulfillment of the 
commitments we took at Doha.”). 
 35 World Trade Organization, General Council, Trade Negotiations Committee, 
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Special Session, 
Geographical Indications—Communication from the European Communities, 
WT/GC/W/547, TN/C/W/26, TN/IP/W/11 (July 14, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Proposal]. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Jon W. Dudas, Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and 
Deputy Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Statement Before the 
Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives (July 22, 2003), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/stratplan2003apr03.htm [hereinafter 
Dudas]. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Other countries include Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, New Zealand, 
Panama, Paraguay, the Philippines, and Chinese Taipei. See WTO Agriculture, supra 
note 3. 
 40 Id. 
 41 General Council Trade Negotiations Committee, Note by the Secretariat: Issues 
Related to the Extension of the Protection of Geographical Indications Provided for in 
Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement to Products Other Than Wines and Spirits, ¶53, 
WT/GC/W/546 (May 18, 2005) [hereinafter Issues Report]. 
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is asking the U.S. Government, U.S. producers, and 
U.S. consumers to subsidize EU producers through 
this ‘claw back’ of generic terms so that EU 
producers can charge monopoly prices for their 
products. . . .  We see no basis for our producers, 
trademark owners, and consumers to be asked to 
stop the use of generic terms.42 
Moreover, opponents of the 2005 Proposal reject the 
accusation that their nationals have “usurped” protected marks.  
Indications of origin have often been used in other countries not 
because users sought to “free-ride,” but rather, because citizens of 
the first country had emigrated to the second, and used the same 
terms for their products that they had used in their countries of 
origin.43 
II. U.S. DOMESTIC LAW 
In addition to the foregoing pragmatic concerns, statutory and 
constitutional hurdles may prevent the 2005 Proposal from 
attaining absolute operation in the U.S.  Part II provides the 
foundation for this conclusion.  Specifically, Part II discusses the 
U.S. trademark law system, which governs geographical 
indications in the U.S. 
A. Background on U.S. Trademark Law 
Trademark law, a subcategory of intellectual property law, 
generally permits sellers to market their items in distinctive 
manners so as to distinguish such items from those of 
competitors.44  United States trademark legislation is founded on 
policy concerns for consumer protection, property rights and 
economic efficiency.45  For example, the purchasing public has an 
interest in being safeguarded from the deceptive practices of 
sellers.46  In turn, sellers have the right to enjoy the fruits of their 
 
 42 Dudas, supra note 37. 
 43 Issues Report, supra note 41, at 15. 
 44 VAGTS ET AL., supra note 6, at 381. 
 45 See 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 2:1. 
 46 See id. 
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marks, which may carry connotations of good will and 
reputation.47  In a world without trademark protections, sellers 
would have no incentive to invest in quality control or similar 
activities necessary to establish strong brand names.48  As a result, 
consumers’ transaction costs in terms of making informed 
purchasing decisions would rise dramatically.49  Thus, trademarks 
not only protect the producer’s investment, they also protect the 
consumer from deceptive and inefficient50 trade practices.51 
The foregoing policies were codified in the Lanham Act of 
1946 (“Act”), which proscribes activities such as trademark 
infringement, trademark dilution, and false advertising.52  The Act 
first provides for the creation of quasi-property rights in 
trademarks, defined as “any word, name, symbol or device, or any 
combination thereof . . . used . . . to identify and distinguish . . . 
goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or 
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that 
source is unknown.”53  The Act also protects collective and 
certification marks.54  Collective marks refer to trademarks that are 
 
 47 See id. 
 48 Id. § 2:3. 
 49 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 
TRADEMARK REP. 267, 271 (1988). 
 50 See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 3:2. 
In general, trademarks perform four functions that are deserving of 
protection in the courts: (1) To identify one seller’s goods and 
distinguish them from goods sold by others; (2) To signify that all 
goods bearing the trademark come from or are controlled by a single, 
albeit anonymous, source; (3) To signify that all goods bearing the 
trademark are of an equal level of quality; and (4) As a prime 
instrument in advertising and selling the goods.  In addition to these 
four functions, it must also be kept in mind that a trademark is also 
the objective symbol of the good will that a business has built up.  
Without the identification function performed by trademarks, buyers 
would have no way of returning to buy products that they have used 
and liked. If this consumer satisfaction and preference is labeled 
‘good will,’ then a trademark is the symbol by which the world can 
identify that good will. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 51 VAGTS ET AL., supra note 6, at 381. 
 52 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2007). 
 53 Id. § 1127. 
 54 Id. § 1054. 
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used in good faith by members of a cooperative or association in 
the ordinary course of commerce.55  Examples of collective marks 
include “CPA,” which indicates members of the Society of 
Certified Public Accountants, and “REALTOR,” which identifies 
real estate professionals as members of an association.56  
Certification marks, on the other hand, refer to “any word, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . used . . . to 
certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, 
quality, accuracy, or other characteristic of such person’s goods or 
services . . . .”57  The “IDAHO” potatoes mark is one example of a 
certification registered in the U.S.58 
The Lanham Act currently offers four separate bases for 
registration of a mark,59 each of which is prima facie evidence of 
the mark’s validity and ownership.60  Unauthorized use of a valid 
mark constitutes the commission of a commercial tort.61  Because 
the quasi-property right associated with trademark pertains to the 
right to prevent consumer confusion, the trademark itself is not 
actually infringed during the commission of such a tort.  Rather, 
what is infringed is the right of the public to be free from 
confusion, and the concomitant right of a trademark owner to 
control a product’s reputation.62  Thus, “[a] trademark owner has a 
 
 55 Id. § 1127. 
 56 See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 2004 WL 763936 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 
31, 2004) (holding that the National Association of Realtors, and the name REALTOR, 
qualifies as a collective mark under the Lanham Act). 
 57 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 58 See Idaho Potato Comm’n v. M & M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130, 132 (2d 
Cir. 2003). 
 59 See 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 19:1 (noting that the following 
procedures allow for mark registration: (1) use-based application, in which an application 
to register is based on prior actual use of the mark in interstate or foreign commerce; (2) 
applications filed by qualified foreign firms, in which applicants must state their bona 
fide intention to use the mark in the U.S., but need not prove actual use; (3) intent-to-use 
applications, which are filed by applicants with bona fide intentions to use the mark on 
the goods or services listed, and which require a verified statement and proof that the 
mark has been used in commerce; (4) extension under the Madrid Protocol, in which 
foreign entities with registration in their home nations can seek to extend that protection 
to obtain U.S. registration). 
 60 LEE BURGUNDER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MANAGING TECHNOLOGY 445 (4th ed. 2007). 
 61 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 2:7. 
 62 Id. § 2:14. 
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property right only insofar as is necessary to prevent consumer 
confusion as to who produced the goods and to facilitate 
differentiation of the trademark owner’s goods.”63 
Though the Lanham Act appears to authorize a broad scope of 
trademark protections, certain marks remain ineligible.  For 
example, generic words cannot be protected under the Act64 
because they merely identify “the genus of which the particular 
product is a species.”65  Thus, while the Act precludes the granting 
of a privatized right in the term “Apple” to a seller of the edible 
fruit, the Act permits the granting of such a right to a seller of 
computers.66  Similarly, the Act fails to recognize marks that are 
likely “to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive . . . .”67  The common law tort of deceit was the precursor 
to this prong of the Act,68 which seeks to protect consumers from 
“confusion as to source.”69  Finally, purely descriptive geographic 
terms cannot be protected by trademark without the acquisition of 
distinctiveness through “secondary meaning.”70  The purpose of a 
trademark is to distinguish an individual’s products from those 
sold by others in the locality.71  Protecting purely descriptive 
geographic names, without more, would not serve this essential 
function; such names would merely indicate the locus of 
production, rather than serve as a meaningful identification of the 
producer.72 
B. Geographical Indications and the Lanham Act 
Despite precluding the recognition of property rights in purely 
descriptive geographic names, the Lanham Act nonetheless permits 
 
 63 Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 
1980). 
 64 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 12:1. 
 65 Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 936 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 66 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 12:1. 
 67 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2006). 
 68 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989). 
 69 Id. at 165. 
 70 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 15:1 (“Secondary meaning requires 
only that customers associate the word or symbol with a single, albeit anonymous, 
commercial source.”). 
 71 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 14:1. 
 72 See Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 324 (1872). 
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protections for geographical indications.73  Property rights for 
geographical indications in the U.S. are protected by appellations 
of origin for U.S. wine, and regional certification for other 
products.74  Under the Lanham Act and the Federal Alcohol 
Administration Act, American wine products may indicate a 
number of specified appellations of origin.75  The Lanham Act 
additionally creates property interests in regional certification 
marks.76  For example, sellers may utilize the mark 
“ROQUEFORT” to signify that their products have been 
manufactured from sheep’s milk, and cured in Roquefort, France, 
in accordance with long-established methods and processes.77  
Registration78 of indications of regional origin prevents outsiders 
from “free-riding” on producers’ designations, and simultaneously 
protects consumers from being misled as to product source 
information.79 
Although geographical indications may thus be protected under 
the certification and collective marks doctrine, the Lanham Act 
does not permit the creation of exclusive, proprietary rights 
therein.  Accordingly, these marks are not owned by the 
seller/producer, but are owned by the individual, state, or 
association responsible for specifying standards and terms for 
licensing use of the mark.80  The Act requires that the mark be 
 
 73 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129.  The Lanham Act also permits states to 
develop their own geographic indication protection regimes.  Though beyond the scope 
of this Note, examples include the Florida Citrus Code of 1949, the Georgia Vidalia 
Onion Act of 1986 and the Idaho Potato Commission’s regulatory actions. 
 74 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 14:1.50. 
 75 27 C.F.R. § 4.25(a)(1) (2006) (options include the United States; a particular county; 
up to three counties in the same state; up to three contiguous states; or a particular grape-
growing “viticultural” region). 
 76 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 77 Terry E. Holtzman, Tips from the Trademark Examining Operation, 81 TRADEMARK 
REP. 180, 181 (1991). 
 78 An application for certification mark registration must specify the following 
elements: (1) the manner in which the mark is used; (2) that the applicant exercises 
legitimate control over the mark; (3) that the applicant is not engaged in the production or 
marketing of the goods or services at issue; (4) the standards that determine under what 
conditions the mark may be used by sellers.  See 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra 
note 2, § 19:50. 
 79 Holtzman, supra note 77, at 185. 
 80 Id. at 184. 
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licensed to all sellers whose products or services meet the 
certifier’s standards,81 and grants owners and licensees alike the 
right to injunctive and monetary relief for infringement.82  Once a 
mark falls victim to “genericide,” in which a designation enters the 
“linguistic commons,” owners and licensees lose their proprietary 
interests in the mark.83  The Act additionally provides that certain 
misrepresentations of origin, regardless of whether the mark at 
issue is deemed generic, constitute commercial tort sounding in 
false designation of origin.84  The following section explores these 
two doctrines. 
C. Applicable U.S. Case Law 
1. The Genericness Inquiry 
Because valid trademarks are of substantial value to owners 
and licensees, the issue of whether a particular trademark has 
become generic is a matter of frequent litigation.  The common law 
test for genericness, as stated by Judge Learned Hand, has been 
codified in the Lanham Act.85  This test examines the factual 
circumstances relating to the public’s understanding of a given 
mark.86  For example, in holding that “ASPIRIN” had become 
generic, Judge Hand asked “[w]hat do the buyers understand by 
the word for whose use the parties are contending?”87  Pursuant to 
this inquiry, courts must contemplate whether the public thinks that 
the mark at issue connotes a generic name of a product, or instead 
indicates one source of that product.88 
Judicial decisions bearing on the genericness inquiry prove 
instructive.  In Community of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, 
Inc.,89 the Second Circuit determined that defendant Faehndrich 
 
 81 Id. at 183. 
 82 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2005); 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2002). 
 83 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 12:1. 
 84 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
 85 See 15 U.S.C. § 1064; Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 
1921). 
 86 See 15 U.S.C. § 1064. 
 87 Bayer, 272 F. at 509. 
 88 See, e.g., 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 2, § 12:4. 
 89 303 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1962). 
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had not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether 
consumers understood “ROQUEFORT” as a generic term.90  In 
that case, the Community of Roquefort was the holder of a 
registered certification mark for its cheese.91  As applied to cheese, 
the “ROQUEFORT” mark could only be used to indicate that the 
product had been manufactured from sheep’s milk, cured in the 
natural caves in Roquefort, France, in accordance with “the 
historic methods and usages of production.”92  Though Faehndrich 
labeled his product “Imported Roquefort Cheese,” his cheese was 
produced in Hungary and Italy.93  In arguing against summary 
judgment, Faehndrich contended that a genuine issue existed as to 
“whether the term ‘Roquefort’ had acquired principal significance 
as a description of blue-mold sheep’s milk, regardless of its origin, 
and without reference” to a particular method of production.94  The 
court rejected Faehndrich’s contention, which was unsupported by 
allegations of facts indicative of genericide.95 
The Trademark Board’s 1998 decision in Institut National Des 
Appellations d’Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp.96 is significant for 
its analysis of alleged genericide with respect to a common law 
regional certification mark.  At issue in Brown-Forman was 
whether the term “COGNAC” constituted a generic name for 
brandy.97  Applicant Brown-Forman sought to register the mark 
“CANADIAN MIST AND COGNAC” for its beverage product, 
which consisted of a mixture of Canadian whiskey and cognac.98  
The Institut National Des Appellations d’Origine (“INAO”) 
opposed the application on the ground that “COGNAC” 
constituted an “appellation of controlled origin” indicative of 
designations of geographic origin and quality.99  The INAO argued 
that Brown-Forman intended, in contravention of the Lanham Act, 
 
 90 Id. at 498. 
 91 Id. at 495. 
 92 Id. at 496 (internal quotations omitted). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 497. 
 95 Id. 
 96 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875 (1998). 
 97 See id. at 1883. 
 98 Id. at 1877. 
 99 Id. 
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to appropriate and trade upon the substantial goodwill and 
recognition that had accrued in the “COGNAC” term.100 
In determining that “COGNAC” qualified as a common law 
regional certification mark that had not become generic, the 
Trademark Board elaborated on the nature of the required fact-
based inquiry.  Rather than asking whether the public is expressly 
aware of the certification function of the mark at issue, the 
Trademark Board emphasized that the proper inquiry focuses on 
whether the public understands that goods bearing the particular 
mark come only from the region named therein.101  Moreover, a 
regional certification mark cannot become a generic term as 
applied to particular goods unless the mark appears to have lost its 
significance as an indication of regional origin for those goods.102  
Because the parties agreed, first, that U.S. purchasers primarily 
understood the designation “COGNAC” to refer to brandy 
originating in the Cognac region of France, and second, that the 
INAO in fact controlled and limited use of the designation, the 
Trademark Board held that “COGNAC” had not fallen victim to 
genericide.103 
The case-by-case approach to the genericide inquiry has also 
produced decisions that uphold genericness.  For example, in the 
pre-Lanham Act case of La Republique Francaise v. Saratoga 
Vichy Spring Company,104 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
mark “VICHY” could be utilized to denote water even if the 
source was not located in or around Vichy, France.105  In that case, 
the defendant sold water that originated from Saratoga Springs, 
New York, using labels displaying the word “Vichy.”106  In 
denying a right to exclusive use of the term, the Court emphasized 
that the owners of the spring in France had acquiesced to their 
mark’s genericide: “For thirty years the defendant . . . has been 
openly and notoriously bottling and selling its waters under the 
 
 100 Id. at 1877–78. 
 101 Id. at 1885. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 1885. 
 104 191 U.S. 427 (1903). 
 105 Id. at 435. 
 106 Id. 
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name of the ‘Saratoga Vichy’ . . . .  [Plaintiff] had allowed the 
name to become generic and indicative of the character of the 
water.”107  Not only had the mark “VICHY” become generic, but 
defendant’s use of the mark was not designed to cause consumer 
confusion: there was no attempt by the defendant to simulate the 
plaintiff’s label, and defendant only used the “VICHY” mark in 
connection with “Saratoga.”108  Accordingly, the Court determined 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief.109 
2. The False Designation of Origin Inquiry 
The Lanham Act provides that certain misrepresentations 
related to a product’s origin, regardless of genericness, may 
constitute a commercial tort.110  Section 1125 of the Act 
establishes civil liability for any person who “uses in commerce 
any word, term, name, symbol or device, or any false designation 
of origin . . . which—(A) is likely to cause confusion . . . or (B) in 
commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of [a person’s] 
goods . . . .”111  Absent indicia of deception, however, a cause of 
action under Section 1125 will not lie.  For example, in Piazza’s 
Seafood World v. Odom, the court determined that a certification 
mark containing the word “CAJUN,” along with other symbols and 
text, was not infringed by use of the brands “Cajun Boy” and 
“Cajun Delight” in relation to seafood products.112  Because the 
Lanham Act does not protect a single term that a party “chooses to 
cull out of [its certification] mark,” and because the allegedly 
infringing marks only utilized one term—“Cajun”—in isolation, 
the Act provided no basis for recovery.113  More specifically, the 
facts of Odom contained “no element of ‘passing off’ or deceptive 
labeling that allows Piazza’s business to prosper by fooling or 
 
 107 Id. at 436–37. 
 108 Id. at 439–40. 
 109 Id. at 441. 
 110 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). 
 111 Id. 
 112 2007 WL 2874436, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 2007). 
 113 Id. 
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confusing the purchaser as to origin—conduct which would have 
taken this case out of the scope of the First Amendment.”114 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY CONFLICTS 
Part III describes the potential First Amendment and Lanham 
Act-related impediments to absolute U.S. implementation of the 
European Union Proposal. 
A. Constitutional Impediments to the 2005 Proposal 
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that the federal treaty 
power under Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution is limited 
in scope, and cannot authorize actions which the Constitution 
otherwise prohibits.115  Accordingly, the First Amendment116 
stands as a bulwark against unfettered U.S. acceptance of the 2005 
Proposal to amend TRIPs, whose enhanced protections of 
geographical indications could impinge on free speech. 
Although the First Amendment does not operate as a license 
for individuals to “trammel on legally recognized rights in 
intellectual property,”117 the Amendment nonetheless protects 
certain elements of commercial speech that are applicable to 
geographical indications.  Since the 1976 case of Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
the Court has recognized a right to commercial speech under the 
First Amendment.118  In that case, the Court invalidated a state law 
that prohibited the advertising of prescription drug prices.119  The 
Court reasoned that, “[a]s to the particular consumer’s interest in 
the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as 
 
 114 Id. 
 115 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
 116 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 117 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 
(5th Cir. 1979). 
 118 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976). 
 119 See generally Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
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keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent 
political debate.”120 
However, in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service 
Commission, the Court emphasized that commercial speech is 
entitled to a lesser degree of protection than are other forms of 
expression.121  The Central Hudson opinion is significant for its 
four-part test under which the constitutionality of commercial 
speech regulation may be analyzed.  First, courts must consider 
whether the speech at issue concerns “lawful activity,” and is not 
“misleading.”122  Second, courts must ask whether the asserted 
government interest in regulating the speech is “substantial.”123  
Third, courts must then determine whether the regulation at issue 
“directly advances the governmental interest asserted,” and fourth, 
whether the regulation “is not more extensive than is necessary to 
serve that interest.”124 The party seeking to uphold the regulation 
carries the burden of justification.125 
Government regulation of commercial speech in accordance 
with the demands of the 2005 Proposal may not always withstand 
scrutiny under the Central Hudson test.  The first prong of that test 
requires that the speech at issue be “misleading.” Although 
proponents of the 2005 Proposal claim that misdescriptive 
geographical terms are inherently misleading, U.S. judicial 
precedent provides otherwise.  Using the name of a country in a 
mark does not automatically render that mark geographically 
descriptive.126  Instead, courts must consider whether “consumers 
would reasonably believe the applicant’s goods are connected with 
the geographic location in the mark . . . .”127  A mark is considered 
“geographically deceptively misdescriptive” if, first, the mark’s 
primary significance is a generally known geographic location; and 
second, consumers would reasonably believe the marked goods are 
 
 120 Id. at 763. 
 121 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980). 
 122 Id. at 566. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (1983). 
 126 In re Save Venice N.Y., Inc., 259 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 127 Id.; see also Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom Am., Inc., 287 F.3d 866, 871 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
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connected with the geographic location in the mark, when in fact, 
they are not.128  The proposition seems dubious that the average 
U.S. consumer who, for instance, purchases Parmesan cheese, has 
any belief that the product originates from Parma, Italy.129  As the 
Second Circuit determined in 1925 with respect to the mark 
“BUDWEISER”—derived from the Bohemian town of Budweis—
“[w]hatever may have been its original weakness, the mark for 
years has acquired a secondary significance, and has indicated the 
plaintiff’s product alone.”130  In light of this precedent, government 
regulation of geographical indication usage under the 2005 
Proposal may sometimes restrict commercial speech that is not 
necessarily misleading.  Such regulation would not pass muster 
under the Central Hudson test, and would, accordingly, be 
constitutionally infirm. 
Even if the government restriction of commercial speech were 
to satisfy the first prong of the Central Hudson analysis, the 
restriction may nonetheless fail the second prong, which requires 
that the regulation be justified by a “substantial” interest.  First, the 
government may only assert an interest in consumer protection on 
a case-by-case basis; as noted, in many cases consumers are not 
misled by geographically misdescriptive marks.131  Second, the 
government does not have a substantial interest in protecting 
members of the European Union from “harmful” commercial 
speech.  As Justice Brandeis proclaimed in his now-vindicated 
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, more speech, rather 
than enforced silence, is the remedy for the expression of alleged 
falsehood.132  Finally, an asserted interest in complying with the 
terms of TRIPs, should the 2005 Proposal be adopted, would 
likewise fail the second prong of the Central Hudson test.  Because 
the federal treaty power is limited by the four corners of the 
 
 128 259 F.3d at 1352. 
 129 See, e.g., Peter Gumbel, Food Fight!, TIME, Aug. 31, 2003, at 44 (quoting one 
member of the Grocery Manufacturers of America, who noted that “[n]obody picks up 
Parmesan cheese in a green can and says, ‘Ah! A fine Italian product.’”). 
 130 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Budweiser Malt Prods. Corp., 295 F. 306, 309 (2d Cir. 
1923). 
 131 See generally Duncan McIntosh Co. Inc. v. Newport Dunes Marina, 324 F. Supp. 2d 
1078, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
 132 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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constitutional text,133 the government necessarily can have no 
interest in abiding by a treaty during those instances in which the 
government’s exercise of power would exceed the Constitution. 
B. Statutory Impediments to the 2005 Proposal 
The current U.S. statutory regime likewise places limits on the 
reach of the 2005 Proposal, should it be implemented.  The statute 
which enacted the TRIPs Agreement provides that “[n]o provision 
of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of 
any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is 
inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.”134  
The statute further emphasizes that “[n]othing in this Act shall be 
construed . . . to amend or modify any law of the United States . . . 
or . . . to limit any authority conferred under any law of the United 
States . . . .”135  Thus, the default “last-in-time” rule136 appears to 
be inoperative in this instance of express legislative intent.  
Accordingly, any amendment to the TRIPs Agreement that violates 
current U.S. law would not be implemented. 
The existing U.S. trademark system would thus be controlling 
in the event of the ratification and implementation of a conflicting 
2005 Proposal.  The Lanham Act, which is rooted in trademark law 
rather than the law of geographical indications, does not allow for 
the protection of generic terms.137  This guidepost would stand in 
opposition to the “claw back” agenda of the 2005 Proposal, which 
aims to re-appropriate generic terms.138 Moreover, the Lanham Act 
provides that prima facie cases alleging false designations of origin 
must demonstrate material deception of a substantial segment of 
consumers.139  The 2005 Proposal, however, calls for regulation of 
 
 133 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
 134 Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994). 
 135 Id. 
 136 See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that if a treaty 
and statute relate to the same subject, courts must endeavor to construe them so as to give 
effect to both; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other). 
 137 Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 935 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 138 See WTO Background, supra note 27. 
 139 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006); see also IQ Prods. Co. v. Penzoil Prods. 
Co., 305 F.3d 368, 375 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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appellations of origin regardless of actual consumer deception.140  
These contradictory elements will arguably lead to difficulties of 
implementation should the 2005 Proposal be ratified. 
IV. FOOD FOR THOUGHT 
From a legal, rather than a pragmatic or political perspective, 
the fate of the 2005 Proposal will be determined by its collision 
with the Lanham Act, and in some cases, with the First 
Amendment.  As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the 2005 
Proposal is fundamentally at odds with the policy underlying the 
U.S. trademark regime.  The legal viability in the U.S. of any 
future claw back proposal thus turns on whether the Europeans 
repudiate their designs to appropriate generic terms, such as 
Parmesan, which generally do not cause consumer confusion. 
Some commentators have suggested that greater comity is 
possible even without such repudiation, and have offered the U.S.-
European Union Wine Pact141 as evidence of a new trend toward 
extended geographical indication protection.142  However, the 
perception that the Wine Pact is precedent for heightened 
geographical indication protection is inaccurate.  In December 
2006, the U.S. implemented a Wine Pact with the European Union, 
which prohibited the use of seventeen semi-generic wine names on 
new U.S. labels, while grandfathering such use for existing 
trademarked labels.143  The practical effect of the Pact is that U.S. 
wine producers are prohibited from marketing and selling in the 
 
 140 2005 Proposal, supra note 35 (containing proposed text for art. 22(2) of the TRIPs 
Agreement). 
 141 26 U.S.C. § 5388; see also Agreement Between the United States of America and the 
European Community on Trade in Wine, Mar. 10, 2006, available at 
http://tcc.export.gov/wcm/groups/tradedataanalysis/@tcc/documents/tradeagreement/euw
ineagreementtext.pdf [hereinafter Wine Pact]. 
 142 See, e.g., Michelle Agdomar, Note, Removing the Greek from Feta and Adding 
Korbel to Champagne: The Paradox of Geographical Indications in International Law, 
18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 541, 556 (2008). 
 143 Congress Approves Wine Agreement Bill With Exceptions, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sec. 
50, Dec. 15, 2006. 
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U.S. new products with labels that include any of the seventeen 
semi-generic names, such as Champagne.144 
On first glance, the Wine Pact may appear to represent the 
“propertizing” of semi-generic terms, and thus to provide a 
foundation for the implementation of the 2005 Proposal.  However, 
the Pact does not purport to create any property right in the 
seventeen semi-generic names.145  Instead, the Pact explicitly states 
that its provisions shall not be construed as “defining intellectual 
property or as obligating the Parties to confer or recognize any 
intellectual property rights.”146  Accordingly, the names included 
in the Pact “are neither considered, nor excluded from being 
considered in the future, geographical indications of the 
[European] Community under U.S. law.”147  Rather than creating 
any property right in semi-generic terms, which would contravene 
the Lanham Act, the Wine Pact merely creates heightened labeling 
regulations, which are enforced in the U.S. not under the Lanham 
Act, but by the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau 
(“TTB”).148  In other words, the Wine Pact does not change the 
legal status of the semi-generic terms, and does not give the 
Europeans any enforcement rights.149 Moreover, the Pact 
additionally provides that “[t]his Agreement is without prejudice to 
the rights of free speech in the United States under the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution . . . .”150  This First 
Amendment savings clause aims to protect comparative 
 
 144 See id.; see also Wine Pact, supra note 141, art. 6(1), art. 7(1). 
 145 Telephone Interview with Amy Cotton, Attorney-Advisor, Office of International 
Relations, United States Patent and Trademark Office (Feb. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Cotton 
Interview]. 
 146 Wine Pact, supra note 141, art. 12(4). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Cotton Interview, supra note 145; see also Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade 
Bureau, Wine Appellations of Origin, http://www.ttb.gov/appellation/index.shtml. 
 149 Cotton Interview, supra note 145. 
 150 Wine Pact, supra note 141, art. 12(3). 
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advertising on wine labels,151 so long as the label passes scrutiny 
under the Central Hudson test.152 
Finally, the Wine Pact should not be viewed as precedent for a 
future geographical indication claw back agreement for the simple 
reason that the U.S. wine industry consented to label regulation.153  
U.S. owners of semi-generic marks in the U.S. wine industry 
voluntarily agreed not to seek new uses for the marks in return for 
requiring the European Union to allow, under specified conditions, 
the use of certain regulated terms on U.S. wine exported to the 
EU.154  Then–U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman, who signed 
the Pact on behalf of the U.S., noted that, by establishing 
predictable conditions for the bilateral wine trade, the Pact “is 
clearly a win-win situation for U.S. and EU winemakers. . . .  
Winemakers on both sides of the Atlantic have the right to be 
proud of how tradition, climate and expertise combine to create 
unique tasting experiences . . . .  This agreement honors these 
differences.”155  The 2005 Proposal thus stands on different ground 
than the Wine Pact for two key reasons: first, the 2005 Proposal 
seeks to create property rights in generic terms; and second, the 
Proposal seeks to preclude geographic indication usage absent 
consent by U.S. producers.  In sum, the Wine Pact can operate 
neither as a model, nor as a foundation, for the solution of the Old 
World-New World divide surrounding geographical indication 
protections. 
From the perspective of U.S. law, then, the viability of any 
future claw back agreement will require European compromise.  
Specifically, the Europeans must abandon their anti–Lanham Act 
designs to obtain property rights in certain generic terms, such as 
Parmesan and Feta, which do not cause consumer confusion in the 
 
 151 See, e.g., Wine Pact, supra note 141, art. 12(3).  For example, the TTB would permit 
a sparkling wine label, which reads “Just as good as French Champagne.” See generally 
id. 
 152 Cotton Interview, supra note 145; see also supra notes 121–125 and accompanying 
text. 
 153 Cotton Interview, supra note 145. 
 154 The United States Mission to the European Union, United States, European Union 
Sign Pact on Wine Trade (Mar. 10, 2006), http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp? 
ID=0B113911-4CF3-4AD2-91DB-6A191AF9F54C. 
 155 Id. 
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U.S.  Moreover, absent industry consent, claw back legislation 
could implicate the First Amendment (and perhaps the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause). 
Even after these concessions, however, a number of practical 
and political problems would remain.  For instance, should U.S. 
producers consent to regulation in exchange for trade concessions, 
such as increased market access, new agency regulation and 
administration would be required.  U.S. taxpayers will likely not be 
eager to foot the bill for foodstuff label regulation, when, from 
their perspective, the status quo ante functioned properly.  
Moreover, because the TRIPs Agreement mandates most-favored 
nations treatment under which any advantage given to one trading 
party under one of the agreements must be given to all trading 
parties under that same agreement,156 claw back regulation would 
become unwieldy.  On the other hand, should U.S. producers 
oppose regulation, policymakers would be imprudent to endorse 
any European claw back proposal. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed extension of TRIPs protections for geographical 
indications leads to a complex controversy.  The ramifications of 
the 2005 Proposal touch upon not only pragmatic, economic 
concerns, but also two touchstones of the U.S. legal system—the 
First Amendment and the trademark regime under the Lanham Act.  
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the broadest reaches of the 
2005 Proposal would be constrained by the Constitution and the 
current statutory scheme.  Although the future vitality and 
legitimacy of TRIPs depend on bona fide attempts to reach 
consensus, such consensus cannot be achieved at the expense of 
the U.S. legal regime.  The Europeans should render their claw 
back designs consistent with the policy undercurrents of the 
Central Hudson test and the Lanham Act in order to get the U.S. to 
the bargaining table.  From a systemic perspective, the Old World 
and New World may, in the end, only be able to raise their glasses 
of Champagne in a toast to the status quo: allowing the Europeans 
 
 156 TRIPs, supra note 1, art. 4. 
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to apply directly to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for 
certification mark approval. 
